Jasminkantarevic.com

Jasmin Kantarevic

WEBWelcome to my website! I am a health economist, with a particular interest in the impact of financial and non-financial incentives on behaviour of health care providers as it relates …

Actived: 8 days ago

URL: http://jasminkantarevic.com/

Simultaneous MH and AS

WEBPHYSICIAN PAYMENT CONTRACTS IN THE PRESENCE OF MORAL HAZARD AND ADVERSE SELECTION: THE THEORY AND ITS APPLICATION IN ONTARIO JASMIN …

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Quality and quantity in primary care mixed-payment models: …

WEBQuality and quantity in primary care 211 FIGURE 1 Distribution of family physicians in Ontario by various models, April 2000 to March 2011 NOTES: FFS = fee-for-service, …

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The Married Widow3.5

WEBThe Married Widow: Marriage Penalties Matter! Michael Baker, Emily Hanna, and Jasmin Kantarevic NBER Working Paper No. 9782 June 2003 JEL No. H2, H3, J1

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LINK BETWEEN PAY FOR PERFORMANCE INCENTIVES AND …

WEBChanging physician practice is a critical step for implementing successful P4P programs. However, recent empirical evidence on the effect of P4P programs on physician practice …

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Author's personal copy

WEBThis article appeared in a journal published by Elsevier. The attached copy is furnished to the author for internal non-commercial research and education use, including for …

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Incentives and Insurance

WEB1. No Uncertainty 2. Uncertainty 9. Teams 10. Tournaments 3. Risk-Averse Agent 4. Risk-Neutral Agent 5. Multiple Signals 6. Multiple Tasks 7. Subjective Signals

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Author's personal copy

WEBAuthor's personal copy Journal of Health Economics30 (2011) 99 111 Contents lists available atScienceDirect Journal of Health Economics journal homepage:www.elsevier

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Introduction to ECO381: Personnel Economics

WEBMeetings and Contact Meetings Tuesdays 5:10-7:00 PM Expected class time 7:10-8:00 PM Office Hours Contact [email protected]

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Risk Neutral Agent

WEBAddressing Efficiency Loss With hidden action, there is an efficiency loss because b = 1/(1+r ) = e < e* = 1 At least two ways to improve incentives (i.e. increase b):

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Risk Averse Agent

WEB1. No Uncertainty 2. Uncertainty 9. Teams 10. Tournaments 3. Risk-Averse Agent 4. Risk-Neutral Agent 5. Multiple Signals 6. Multiple Tasks 7. Subjective Signals

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Problem Set 4-RiskNeutralAgent

WEBECO381 Problem Set 4 2 for children in classes with more than 20 students is given by 5+u, where u is the

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ECO381 Research Assignment

WEB2 Research Tasks For the incentive problem you choose to write about, the paper should cover the following sections, in the same order as they are listed (maximum marks for …

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